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In this conceptual paper we suggest that a critical realist perspective alters 
managerial views on prediction and strategy formation. For that purpose, we 
review alternative notions of prediction in economic theory in the light of critical 
realism. In addition, we review the role of prediction in alternative streams of 
thought on strategy formation. The corollary of such a literature review is a new 
conceptualisation of the organisational environment as an open system which is 
not prone to prediction but can be a source of learning for strategists. Such 
critical realist view alerts researchers and practitioners for the provisional nature 
of scientific explanations and the dangers of premature prediction. Critical 
realism is thus a promising avenue for further research on strategy formation 
and more appropriate strategizing.  
 






Critical realism is a perspective within the philosophy of social science that has 
been subsequently applied to the study of economics and management – see, 
for example, Lawson (1997, 2003) or Fleetwood (1999). According to the critical 
realist view, social systems are dynamic open systems, constituted by internally 
related phenomena. This means that constant regularities, such as those 
constructed under laboratory conditions in the natural sciences, are not 
ubiquitous in the social realm. Therefore, prediction of events is not possible in 
the social realm in the same sense as in the natural sciences. This topic has 
received much attention recently in light of the Global Financial Crisis, and the 
role played by mathematical economic and financial models of prediction, which 
have failed to predict successfully the macroeconomic situation before the 
crisis, during the crisis, and after the crisis – see, for example, Lawson (2009) 
for a discussion. 
The fact that prediction of events is not possible in the same sense as in 
the natural sciences clearly has implications for strategic management, which 
must be informed by a clear understanding of the global macroeconomic 
environment. In this paper, we argue that economic and strategic management 
theory would benefit from the critical realist view, particularly in terms of how the 
environment is conceived in the process of strategy formation.  
The following section thus introduces the role of prediction in economic 
theory. The third and fourth sections discuss the inappropriateness of 
deductivist models to study economic phenomena as open and closed systems, 
respectively. The fifth section contrasts isolation in deductivist models and 
abstraction in critical realist explanations. The sixth section applies such a 
critical realist view of prediction in economic theory to strategy formation. The 
final section discusses the implications of a critical realist view for strategy 
formation in theory and in practice.      
  
The role of prediction in economic theory 
 
“My article [on the nature of the firm] starts by making a methodological point: it is 
desirable that the assumptions we make in economics should be realistic. Most readers 
will pass over the opening sentences (Putterman omits them when reprinting my article), 
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and others will excuse what they read as a youthful mistake, believing, as so many 
modern economists do, that we should choose our theories on the basis of the accuracy 
of their predictions, the realism of their assumptions being utterly irrelevant. I did not 
believe this in the 1930s and, as it happens, I still do not.” (Coase 1993: 52) 
 
The methodological perspective that Ronald Coase is criticising here is the view 
normally attributed to Milton Friedman (1953:21), who argues that “the ultimate 
goal of a positive science” is the prediction of “phenomena not yet observed”, 
and that models can (even should) be unrealistic as long as they predict. 
Friedman’s methodological perspective was criticised by prominent economists 
like Paul Samuelson (1963), amongst others, advocates that successful 
prediction, whilst a necessary condition for successful economic practice, is not 
a sufficient condition. 
This is an old debate in economic theory, but it has not been addressed 
by subsequent mainstream economists with the same degree of detail as 
Friedman and Samuelson did. Furthermore, the issues at stake in this debate 
have been brought back to the forefront of economic and public debate in light 
of the Global Financial Crisis, which raised again the appropriateness of the 
methods employed by economists, which were to a great extent defined during 
the mid-twentieth century, under the influence of Friedman and Samuelson – 
see Lawson (1997, 2003, 2009). 
 In fact, contemporary mainstream economists still employ the methods 
advocated by Friedman and Samuelson long ago, and the only question that 
emerges within the mainstream community when employing those methods 
concerns whether they are used in an instrumentalist perspective as Friedman 
advocated, or in a realist perspective as Samuelson advocated (albeit 
inconsistently) – see Lawson (1997, 2003) for a discussion. We will address this 
debate here, but emphasising a perspective that is present in some economic 
methodology literature under the heading of critical realism (e.g. Lawson, 1997; 
Martins, 2013). Essential to our argument is a rejection of the idea that 
successful prediction of events is necessary or indeed always possible. Most 
critics of Friedman have failed to question these premises. However, we shall 
argue that for successful modelling endeavour, successful prediction of events 
is neither necessary nor sufficient.  It is also the case that prediction of events is 
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only achievable under certain very special conditions. It is only when we realise 
that prediction of events is not necessary, and sometimes impossible, that we 
can properly address (and refute) Friedman's claim that it is sufficient. 
Prediction is often identified as the main goal of science. This concern 
with prediction figures prominently within economics too. In his 1953 essay “The 
Methodology of Positive Economics”, Milton Friedman argues: 
 
“The ultimate goal of a positive science is the development of a ‘theory’, or ‘hypothesis’ 
that yields valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet 
observed. Such a theory is, in general, a complex intermixture of two elements. In part, it 
is a ‘language’ designed to promote ‘systematic and organized methods of reasoning’. In 
part, it is a body of substantive hypotheses designed to abstract essential features of 
complex reality.” (Friedman 1953: 21) 
 
One of the implications that Friedman draws from his assessment that 
prediction is the only purpose of economic modelling is that the “assumptions” 
(the “substantive hypotheses designed to abstract essential features of complex 
reality”, 1953: 21) underlying the abstract models must be “false”, in the sense 
that models and theories are only instruments. But note that to be coherent with 
the idea that theories are only instruments, one should say that it does not 
matter whether theories are true or false, instead of saying that they are “false”. 
Friedman’s choice of the term “false” seems to imply that the world must 
be more complex than any “simple” and “fruitful” theory, which are Friedman’s 
(1953: 23) criteria for model selection. Most economists disagree with Friedman 
when he argues that prediction of events is a sufficient condition for economic 
modelling. Samuelson, one of the economists who criticised Friedman’s 
position, argues: 
 
“[U]nrealistic, abstract models often prove to be useful in the hint of […]regularities. This 
psychological usefulness should not be confused with empirical validity. […] Such 
abstract models are like scaffolding used to build a structure; the structure must stand by 
itself. If the abstract models contain empirical falsities, we must jettison the models, not 




According to Samuelson, one can use Friedman’s models to find a “structure”, 
but one has also to “jettison” those models after using them, if they contain 
empirical falsities. Samuelson did neither focus on the fact that Friedman 
regarded prediction of observable events as the “ultimate goal” of economics, 
nor criticise the use of Friedman’s false models.  
Most of the critiques of Friedman’s position within the field of mainstream 
economics share Samuelson’s concerns. Most mainstream economic practice 
subscribes the “abstract models”, typically mathematical models, advocated by 
Friedman. Also, even though many economists agree with the claim that 
prediction of events (using mathematical models) is a necessary condition for 
economic modelling, few would agree that prediction of events is sufficient for 
economic modelling. 
In order for prediction of events to be possible, a model of the economy 
must establish constant and exact relations between events. We will use the 
expression deductivist models to denote models for which regularities of the 
form ‘if event X then event Y’ are a necessary condition. Notice that in many 
cases these mathematical regularities are given a stochastic form. 
Nevertheless, even in those cases the model will still consist in a functional 
relationship of the form ‘if event X then event Y’ (combined with some stochastic 
component, represented through a random variable) and hence the model still 
assumes a deductivist form. 
In the following section we will argue that if the sort of abstract models 
that both Friedman and Samuelson suggest are deductivist models (of which 
mathematical models are an example), then they are inappropriate in open 
systems. In the fourth section, we will argue that Samuelson’s methodology can 
never perform better than Friedman’s in closed systems. To make this 
argument, we will refer to the distinction between open systems and closed 
systems. 
 
Deductivist modelling in open systems: events vs. underlying structures  
According to Tony Lawson (1997, 2003), closed systems are systems in which 
constant conjunctions of the form “whenever event X then event Y” occur. 
Systems where these constant conjunctions do not always occur, on the other 
hand, are open systems.  
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Deductivist models are the most common type of models in modern 
economic analysis. These models rely on the presence of observable constant 
conjunctions, that is, presuppose “closed systems”. Afterwards, one can obtain 
predictions of events using these models. 
Now, as Tony Lawson (1997, 2003) notes, a problem with this deductivist 
methodology is that these exact regularities (which we intend to model) do not 
typically occur in economics. In the natural sciences, deductivist models are 
used with great success. But this is so because natural scientists put much 
effort into creating an experimental arrangement where a closed system will be 
generated, so that deductivist models can be applied to the regularities that are 
generated in the experiment. These experimental set-ups are artificially built in 
order to trigger and thus identify the underlying causal mechanisms, structures 
or tendencies that drive the observed events – and the underlying causal 
mechanisms, structures or tendencies can be identified using deductivist 
models only because a closed system was first generated. 
Once the underlying causal mechanisms, structures or tendencies are 
identified, it is possible to predict their effects. But outside the conditions of the 
experimental situation, the relevant conception of reality is that of an open 
system, where the exact regularities that deductivist models presuppose are not 
ubiquitous; the effects of underlying causal mechanisms, structures or 
tendencies will not necessarily be manifest in an exact way due to other 
countervailing tendencies that may be at play out of the experimental situation. 
In Friedman’s conception, science is only concerned with prediction of 
events, or “phenomena not yet observed” (1953:21), without providing any 
realist account of the underlying structures and mechanisms that cause the 
events we observe. According to Lawson’s conception, on the other hand, the 
aim of economic explanation is not the prediction of events, but rather the 
identification of the real structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies that 
cause the events we observe – something that natural scientists achieve 
through experimental control. Hence, in Lawson’s realist methodology, theories 
and models are about real structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies that 
cause events. So if any prediction is possible, it is about underlying structures, 




Notice that this concern with underlying causes seems to be in 
accordance with Samuelson’s (1963: 236) idea that deductivist models are 
useful to “build a structure”, where this structure “must stand by itself”. But note 
too that in economics, and in the social sciences in general, it is not possible to 
create laboratory conditions with the same precision as in the natural sciences. 
In the natural sciences, deductivist models can always be employed as long as 
a closed system situation can be artificially created in a laboratory. 
In economics, however, since a closed system will very hardly be created 
in a laboratory situation, it will become very difficult to use deductivist models, 
unless the closure conditions are already present in the analysed phenomena. 
Thus, when in the presence of open systems (i.e., when constant conjunction of 
the form “if event X then event Y” are not ubiquitous), the deductivist 
methodology both Friedman and Samuelson employ is inappropriate. 
To reject Friedman’s position, however, one must first show that: (i) the 
social realm (or at least a significant part of it) is an open system; and (ii) the 
social realm is an open system in which closed systems cannot be generated 
(for example, in an experimental arrangement) in the same way as in the 
natural realm. We will turn to these issues now. 
Proposition (i) follows from observing a generalised feature of 
experience: that regularities of the sort ‘if X then Y’ are not ubiquitous in the 
social realm. In fact, they are not ubiquitous in the natural realm either (with the 
notable exception of celestial mechanics), and that is why an experimental 
arrangement must be generated under laboratory conditions so that deductivist 
methods can be applied. There are, of course, some closures in the social 
realm (as there are also in the natural realm), and there are therefore some 
cases of success in using deductivist models in economics without experimental 
control whenever these closures are present – on which see, for example, 
Engle et al. (1997). But many interesting situations for scientific analysis 
(perhaps the most interesting cases) constitute open systems. 
Proposition (ii) springs from the fact that, unlike natural sciences, social 
sciences deal with a type of material that cannot be isolated in a closed system 
without it losing properties that are essential to explain social behaviour. One of 
the reasons for this is that human beings do not always follow laws of behaviour 
like natural phenomena, and always have the possibility of choice – that is, any 
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action could have been otherwise. Another reason is the existence of internal 
relations. According to Lawson (2003: 17): 
 
 “[T]he social realm is […] highly internally related. Aspects or items are said to be 
internally related when they are what they are, or can do what they do, by virtue of the 
relations in which they stand”. 
 
If we are modelling a system of isolated atoms, to regard a given part as (to 
some extent) independent from others can lead us to a model that captures the 
essence of the analysed phenomena – for the object of analysis will be per se 
already constituted of isolated parts, closed to external influences, and so 
deductivist models can be successfully used. 
But if our object of analysis consists of internally related phenomena 
(whose interrelations within its constitutive parts are essential to our 
understanding of the phenomena), to isolate some aspects from others that are 
influencing the latter (in a laboratory situation, for example), will lead to a model 
that ignores fundamental relations within the analysed phenomena. 
Furthermore, the whole may display properties that “emerge” out of the parts 
and their relations, but are irreducible to the parts regarded as isolated. 
Elsewhere, Lawson writes: 
 
“Emergence may be defined as a relationship between two features or aspects such that 
one arises out of the other and yet, while perhaps being capable of reacting back to it, 
remains causally and taxonomically irreducible to it.” (Lawson, 1997: 63). 
 
Thus, to model parts of a highly internally related whole as if they were isolated 
will not deliver us a model that captures emergent properties. In an open 
system, which comprises internally related and emergent phenomena, 
economic analysis will very hardly find underlying structures and tendencies 
using deductivist models or any sort of isolationist procedure. Since the 
existence of internal relations and emergent properties does not allow us to 
isolate a fragment of the phenomena to be analysed (for example, under some 
experimental arrangement), then a closed system cannot be generated. And 
hence, a deductivist methodology will not be appropriate. 
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When in the presence of open systems, internal relations and emergence 
(where the two latter features make it very hard to create a closed system under 
laboratory conditions) there is no reason to believe that prediction of event 
regularities (as Friedman puts it, of “phenomena not yet observed”) can be 
done. 
The core of most critiques of Friedman’s position (including Samuelson’s 
critique) agrees in that prediction of events using deductivist models is a 
necessary condition for economic modelling (deductivist models and prediction 
of events are essential to economic analysis), but not a sufficient condition for 
economic modelling. But the more fundamental critique of Friedman, and of his 
instrumentalism, is rather that prediction of events might not even be a 
necessary condition for economic analysis, for closed systems are not 
ubiquitous. 
 
Deductivist modelling in closed systems: correlation vs. explanation 
If, for some reason, the analysed sphere of reality spontaneously constituted, or 
at least approximated, a closed system, even without it being subject to 
experimental control, deductivist procedures based on closure assumptions 
could be undertaken – constant conjunctions could be modelled by means of 
correlation analysis. 
Edward Leamer (1985), for example, proposed a methodology of 
analysis with the purpose of testing whether the relations between the variables 
we are interested in are “robust” (as opposed to “fragile”) enough to changes in 
a subset of other variables (this procedure is known as “Extreme Bounds 
Analysis”), since “[a] fragile inference is not worth taking seriously” (Leamer 
1985: 308). If the change in the subset of the latter variables does not affect 
significantly the coefficients associated with the variables of interest, then the 
correlation is said to be “robust”. This can be interpreted as a test of how robust 
is a closure, i.e. testing the extent to which the observed correlations in the 
variables of interest can be viewed as independent from other variables (since 
we cannot insulate them in a laboratory). 
It is worth noting that even though all “robust” relations constitute a 
closed system, not all closed systems are necessarily “robust”. A system that is 
insulated from everything else in a laboratory situation may be nevertheless 
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extremely fragile out of the laboratory situation (of course that once it is 
insulated, it is then “robust” in the sense that changes in what it was insulated 
from will not affect the artificially insulated system). In economics one can rarely 
obtain a laboratory situation, and hence Leamer uses the stronger concept of 
robustness, which can be interpreted as meaning that closure conditions 
already hold in the analysed phenomena without laboratorial manipulation. 
Now, an important question in this situation, where closure and empirical 
observable regularities are already present in the analysed sphere of reality, is 
whether we can develop criteria to choose between competing “more 
complicated and realistic hypotheses” (that we can entertain using a deductivist 
framework, as Samuelson suggests) on the one hand, or Friedman’s 
methodology on the other hand. 
Can we identify underlying causal mechanisms when using deductivist 
models, in a reality that displays empirically observable closures but cannot be 
subject to laboratory control? In the natural sciences, one can construct 
different experimental arrangements where causal powers can be triggered or 
not, and the underlying structures can be identified because of the different 
observations that arise under different experimental settings. But if, on the other 
hand, we only observe regularities of the sort ‘if X then Y’ in a closed system 
(that cannot be subject to experimental control in the same way as in the natural 
sciences), what can we call a “causal relation” apart from this correlation? And 
what can our scientific theory consist in apart from these correlations?  
Zellner (1979), in a paper titled “Causality and Econometrics”, quotes 
Feigl as an account of a “philosophical definition of causality” in the context of 
econometric analysis, arguing that “[t]he clarified (purified) concept of causation 
is defined in terms of predictability according to a law (or more adequately, to a 
set of laws)” (Feigl, 1953: 408, emphasis in original). 
This reinforces the idea that when it comes to applying economic models 
in order to uncover causal mechanisms presupposing that a closed system is 
already present in the analysed sphere of reality, all that can actually be done is 
to define “causality” as the correlation between y and x, through a mapping f. In 
this sort of analysis, not much more can be said apart of this correlation. This 
correlation exhausts what we define as “causality” in a “natural” closed system. 
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Besides, Feigl’s account of causality also entails that causality will be 
predictability, which is precisely Friedman’s criterion. Thus, under the 
assumptions that are implicit in the deductivist models that both Friedman and 
Samuelson employ, and in a sphere of reality that constitutes a closed system 
and is not subject to experimental control, Samuelson’s methodology cannot 
perform better than Friedman’s, since in such a case “causal” explanation 
cannot go beyond correlation of events towards the uncovering of structures (as 
Samuelson suggests). 
Even if we assume causality to be a mapping f of x to y, and thus 
assume that something can be said about “causes” in this sense, Friedman’s 
“abstract” models would lead to the same “causal relations” (i.e. correlations) as 
Samuelson’s “abstract” models. Thus, prediction of events is possible using 
mathematical deductivist methods in the presence of closed systems, but under 
such conditions economic explanation will not be able to go beyond Friedman’s 
methodology: we cannot undertake causal explanation under such conditions, 
unless by “causal” explanation we mean event correlation. 
 
From correlation of events to explanation of underlying structures  
The question remains as to what alternatives are there for economic modelling. 
Amartya Sen argues: 
 
“[…] it is necessary to consider the distinction between realism in the sense of ‘nothing 
but the truth’ and that in the sense of ‘the whole truth’. An assumption can be realistic in 
that it is true without the claim being made that it is exhaustive in capturing all aspects of 
the reality. Advocates of realism in the sense of ‘nothing but the truth’ need not demand 
‘the whole truth’. The dissatisfaction with Friedman’s position on the part of critics such as 
Samuelson does not arise from Friedman’s rejection of ‘the whole truth’, but from his 
rejection of ‘nothing but the truth’.” (Sen, 1980:358) 
 
This idea of departing from ‘the whole truth’, but not from ‘nothing but the truth’, 
can be interpreted in line with Tony Lawson’s notion of abstraction. Abstraction 
(as defined in Lawson, 1997, 2003) consists in focusing on one aspect while 
leaving other aspects aside momentarily, but without supposing that other 
things left aside are not playing a role in what is observed. Isolation, on the 
other hand, consists in picking up a part of the analysed reality while supposing 
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that other things left aside are not playing a role in the part of reality we are 
analysing. 
Now, if the parts one is treating as isolated are not in fact isolated (for 
example, when they are internally related), to see them as such becomes a 
fictionalising exercise: since one would not account for the fact that other 
aspects of reality left aside are playing a role in the analysed sphere of reality, 
our description of such sphere of reality would then be a fiction – and a 
departure from ‘nothing but the truth’. But through abstraction, one can focus on 
some aspects of reality in order to understand such sphere of reality without 
assuming that these aspects are isolated from all others – departing from ‘the 
whole truth’, but not from ‘nothing but the truth’. 
Lawson’s notion of abstraction seems to be an appropriate starting point 
for modelling when in the presence of open systems. This is an alternative to 
Friedman’s and Samuelson’s “abstract [deductivist] models”, which are actually 
“fictions” rather than “abstractions” in Lawson’s sense, as both Friedman and 
Samuelson recognise when saying that they are “false” or may contain 
“empirical falsities”. 
Now, which features of reality should be abstracted, selected or chosen 
in order to initiate an explanatory procedure? Lawson suggests starting from 
demi-regularities, which are defined as partial regularities over a definite region 
of time-space. For Lawson, analysing such demi-regularities (and contrastive 
demi-regularities in particular) is essential for the process of explanation. 
But this does not yet answer to the question of how one can identify 
underlying causal factors of a given phenomenon, if the sphere of reality under 
analysis constitutes an open system that cannot be subject to experimental 
control. How can one move from abstractions and demi-regularities towards 
causal explanation of structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies? 
Lawson argues that even though an experimental arrangement might 
prove impossible in the social realm, conditions similar to those of an 
experimental arrangement might nevertheless occur in a given sphere of reality. 
In the same way that a causal structure, power, mechanism or tendency is 
insulated in an experiment (and hence identified), it may be that, under some 
circumstances, a given causal mechanism is observed at play while relatively 
insulated from other causal mechanisms. 
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Lawson (2003) gives the example that the yield of a given crop field may 
contrast with the yield of the other fields. This contrast may be the result of the 
fact that a given causal mechanism (or set of causal mechanisms) was at play 
on that crop field, but not on the other crop fields. Hence, a causal mechanism 
was at play while relatively insulated from other causal mechanisms, and could 
therefore be identified. 
Lawson argues that two ingredients are essential for contrast 
explanation: “an informed (if often tacitly formed or implicit) judgement about 
conditions operating over the contrast space” (Lawson 2003:92); and “a relation 
between outcomes within the contrast space is eventually recorded that is 
regarded by the researcher (or whoever) as surprising or in some way of 
concern or interest” (Lawson 2003:93). 
There is of course an important difference between experimental 
analysis and contrast explanation. While the experiment is forward looking, 
contrast explanation will be backward looking. In an experiment the scientist 
actively constructs an arrangement that will insulate a given causal mechanism. 
But when using contrast explanation, one must wait and hope that an 
interesting and surprising contrast (and contrastive demi-regularities) will arise 
(generated by the fact that a causal mechanism became somehow relatively 
insulated), so that the underlying causal mechanism (or set of causal 
mechanisms) that generated the contrast can be identified. Given the difficulty 
of constructing experimental arrangements in the social sciences (such as 
economics), contrast explanation seems to be the best methodological 
procedure available that allows us to observe a causal mechanism relatively 
insulated in an open system. 
 
The role of the environment in strategy formation 
The conception of social reality we adopt, and in particular our conception of 
economic reality, has implications for the methods adopted when studying it, 
and when navigating within it. The approach to management we follow depends 
heavily on our ability to identify causal mechanisms at play within the 
organisation, and within the environment faced by the organisation. If we accept 
that the economic environment faced by the company is an open system, then 
we must take this fact into consideration in strategic choices. Strategy formation 
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must deal with a wide range of organisational and environmental factors in an 
open system where events cannot be predicted with certainty, and all we can 
achieve is knowledge of underlying structures, powers, mechanisms and 
tendencies which contribute to produce a given outcome. 
This clearly means that strategy assessment must focus on long term 
processes where underlying structures, mechanisms and tendencies which are 
present in the organisation and in the environment, become manifest over time, 
rather than on specific events which cannot be predicted. It also means that a 
particularly useful methodological procedure available consists in case studies 
where causal mechanisms at play within an open system can be identified 
through contrast explanation. As Lawson (2003) notes, contrast explanation is 
the best methodological alternative to laboratory experiments available when it 
is not possible to generate artificially a closed system in order to apply 
mathematical-deductivist methods. 
Of course, when engaging in case study research, or indeed in any type 
of research, we must possess some previous conception of the processes 
under study. In a complex open system, it is impossible to address reality 
without some explanatory framework that guides us in our initial approach to 
reality. The framework used may, of course, turn out to be inaccurate, or in 
need of revision, when confronted with the facts. Scientific progress consists 
precisely in the transformation of existing conceptions. But some previous 
conception is needed when addressing reality.  
In an extensive review of over 2000 publications in the field of strategic 
management, Mintzberg et al. (2009) distinguish between ten schools of 
thought on strategy formation (Table 1 below), which point towards different 
approaches to the problem of prediction.  
 
Table 1. Schools of thought on strategy formation (adapted from Mintzberg et 
al., 2009) 
Stream of thought Strategy formation Observations 
Design school Conception process Prescriptive, 1960s 
Planning school Formal process Prescriptive, 1970s 
Positioning school Analytical process Prescriptive, 1980s 
Entrepreneurial school Visionary process Descriptive, individual 
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Cognitive school Mental process Descriptive, individual 
Learning school Emergent process Descriptive, organisational 
Power school Negotiation process Descriptive, organisational 
Cultural school Collective process Descriptive, organisational 
Environmental school Reactive process Descriptive, incremental 
Configuration school Transformation process Descriptive, quantic 
  
The design school regards strategy formation as a process of conception in 
which environmental opportunities and threats are scanned, forecasted and 
matched with internal strengths and weaknesses, leading to ‘play to your 
strengths’ strategies that are rationally evaluated, selected, and implemented 
(e.g. Christensen et al., 1982). The planning school attempts to formalise such 
strategy formation endeavour as a process of near ‘paralysis by analysis’ (e.g. 
Ansoff, 1965). The positioning school also tries to match the environment and 
the organisation, but focuses on content rather than process, conceiving 
strategy formation as a rational choice between alternative generic strategies 
(Porter, 1980).  
These first three schools – design, planning, and positioning – are 
prescriptive in the sense that they prescribe rather than describe a certain 
approach to strategy formation. The seven remaining schools, by contrast, 
describe strategy formation in practice rather than prescribing it.  
The entrepreneurial and cognitive schools focus on the individual level of 
analysis. The entrepreneurial school regards strategy formation as a visionary 
process by which the entrepreneur is able to anticipate change, whereas the 
cognitive school considers strategy formation the result of individual mental 
processes by which information is processed.  
The learning, power, and cultural schools, by contrast, focus on the 
organisational level of analysis. The learning school describes strategy 
formation as an emergent rather than linear process, in which doing does not 
follow but overlaps with thinking. The power school focuses on processes by 
which strategy is negotiated, whereas the cultural school regards strategy 
formation as a consequence of shared values.  
The last two schools – environmental and configuration schools – focus 
on the rhythm of change. The environmental school emphasises evolutionary 
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change in reaction to the environment, whereas the configuration school 
stresses quantic transformation based on insights of all schools.      
Mintzberg et al. (2009: 302-303) claim that in the ten schools of thought 
the environment is conceived rather vaguely, either as a factor or as the actor of 
strategy formation: 
 
“Among the actors at centre stage of the schools so far discussed – the chief, the 
planner, the brain, the organization, and so on – one has been conspicuous by its 
absence. That is the set of forces outside the organisation, what organisation theorists 
like to call (rather loosely) the ‘environment’. The other schools see this as a factor; the 
environmental school sees it as an actor – indeed the actor. (…) What, then, is this thing 
called ‘environment’? Not much, in fact, even here. It is usually treated as a set of vague 
forces ‘out there’ – in effect, everything that is not organisation.”  
 
The design school, “without question, the most influential view of the strategy-
formation process” (Mintzberg et al., 2009: 24), regards the environment as a 
factor of strategy formation. This school is associated with two books at the 
University of California (Selznick, 1957; Chandler, 1962) as well as with the 
General Management group at the Harvard Business School (Learned et al., 
1965; Christensen et al., 1982; Rumelt, 1997; Hambrick and Fredrickson, 
2005).  
Common to these contributions is the assumption that organisational 
strengths and weaknesses should fit environmental opportunities and threats, 
establishing the basis for creation, evaluation and choice of strategy. According 
to Rumelt (1997), a key test in the evaluation of strategy is ‘consonance’, that is, 
the strategy must represent an adaptive response to the external environment 
and to the critical changes occurring within it. Popular analytical tools such as 
the SWOT and PEST frameworks are thus inspired by the design school, which 
also assumes “foreseeable change in the social, political, and macroeconomic 
context” (Christensen et al., 1982: 179-80).  
Such emphasis on forecasting implies that the design school holds more 
optimistic assumptions concerning managerial prediction than practitioners (e.g. 
World Economic Forum, 2014). In fact, Mintzberg et al. (2009: 33) consider that 
one of the key assumptions of the design school, a sharp distinction between 
strategy formulation and implementation, follows classical notions of rationality 
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which separate thinking and acting. The authors question this assumption by 
claiming that the environment is not sufficiently predictable or stable to allow 
such a distinction (Mintzberg et al., 2009: 43): 
     
“The external environment is not some kind of pear to be plucked from the tree of 
external appraisal. It is, instead, a major and sometimes unpredictable force to be 
reckoned with. Sometimes conditions change unexpectedly so that intended strategies 
become useless. (…) Behind the very distinction between formulation and 
implementation lies a set of very ambitious assumptions: that environments can always 
be understood, currently and for a period of well into the future, either by the senior 
management or in ways that can be transmitted to that management; and that the 
environment itself is sufficiently stable, or at least predictable, to ensure that the 
formulated strategies today will remain viable after implementation.”  
 
According to Mintzberg et al. (2009: 28-29), the design school provides the 
basis for other schools which elaborate specific aspects of strategy formation 
such as formality in the planning school, analysis in the positioning school, and 
adaptability in the learning school. In the planning school, the environment is 
regarded as a set of economic forces such as industry, competition, and 
market. In the positioning school such a view becomes more deterministic, 
since managerial choice is confined to a small set of generic strategies (Porter, 
1980).  
In the cognitive school, the environment is regarded as a source of 
confusing signals for the strategist which are too complex to be understood. 
Such complexity is also present in the learning school which emphasises active 
experimentation rather than passive reaction. In the remaining schools “the 
environment has tended to be absent, incidental, or at least assumed” 
(Mintzberg et al., 2009: 303), with the exception of the environmental school 
which makes the environment the main actor of strategy formation. 
Within the environmental school, at least three different views can be 
distinguished: contingency theory, population ecology, and institutional theory. 
Contingency theory (e.g. Donaldson, 2001) postulates that the ‘one best way’ of 
classical management theory should be replaced by the ‘it all depends’ view of 
organisations based on contingencies such as size, technology, competition, 
and environmental stability. In order to systematise the match between different 
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situations and respective behaviours, contingency theory describes the 
environment in terms of dimensions and delineates organisational responses in 
terms of structure (e.g. Pugh et al., 1969) and strategy (e.g. Miller, 1979). 
Mintzberg (1979), for instance, synthesises environmental dimensions into four 
main characteristics: stability, complexity, diversity, and hostility.  
Population ecology (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977) shares the focus 
of contingency theory on the environment, but assumes that actions of 
managers in the early life of an organisation create inertia that subsequently 
reduces their freedom to adapt. External pressures towards inertia include, 
among others, barriers to entry and exit, access to information, resistance to 
change, and collective rationality. Especially important is the notion of ‘fixed 
carrying capacity’ borrowed from biology, according to which an industry has a 
finite amount of resources dictating the ‘survival of the fittest’ among its member 
organisations.  
From this perspective, strategy is a process of continuous adaptation 
which by accident can lead to success based on efficiency in maximising 
environmental fit or flexibility in reserving excess resources for the future. As a 
result, the adolescence of an organisation tends to be problematic since it lacks 
the flexibility of earlier days and the resourcefulness of older organisations. 
Such problems are labelled liabilities (e.g. Henderson, 1999), namely of 
adolescence, newness and smallness. According to Mintzberg et al. (2009: 
309): “Some liabilities will only occur under certain circumstances, whereas in 
other cases liabilities may actually compete for influence. The interaction of 
liabilities can therefore be complex and unpredictable, which from a managerial 
point of view makes population ecology rather limited in usefulness”. 
Institutional theory is also focused on environmental pressures, but they 
are regarded as norms that organisations must comply with, rather than sources 
of entropy. In particular, the environment is regarded as a repository of 
economic (tangible) and symbolic (reputational) resources that protect the 
organisation from uncertainty in its environment (e.g. loss of credibility). In order 
to accumulate such resources, organisations thus tend to adopt similar 
structures and practices through ‘institutional isomorphism’ (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977) of coercive (e.g. regulations), mimetic (e.g. imitation) or normative (e.g. 
professional norms) nature. 
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The role of managerial prediction in strategy formation is therefore 
present in at least six of the ten schools of thought presented by Mintzberg et al. 
(2009). In the design and planning schools the environment is regarded as a set 
of general yet predictable forces such as political, economic, social, and 
technological opportunities and threats (e.g. Christensen et al., 1982). In the 
planning school the level of analysis is reduced from macro to meso, focusing 
on aggregated forces at the industry level such as competitors, customers, and 
suppliers (e.g. Porter, 1980).  
In addition to these three prescriptive schools, the environment is present 
in three descriptive schools: cognitive, learning, and environmental. In the 
cognitive school, the level of analysis is individual and therefore the 
environment is regarded as a source of informational ambiguity for the 
individual strategist. In the learning school, the level of analysis is organisational 
with the environment being regarded as a source of complexity. The 
environmental school shares this view of the environment as characterized by a 
certain degree of complexity, in addition to other dimensions such as stability, 
diversity, and hostility (Mintzberg, 1979).  
In addition, the environment can be a source of inertia (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977) as well as of coercive, mimetic, and normative ‘institutional 
isomorphism’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Table 2 below synthesises the role of 
the environment in strategy formation.  
 
Table 2. Schools of thought on strategy formation (adapted from Mintzberg et 
al., 2009) 
Stream of thought Conception of environment Observations 
Design school Predictable opportunities and 
threats at the macro level 
Prescriptive, 1960s 
Planning school Predictable opportunities and 
threats at the macro level 
Prescriptive, 1970s 
Positioning school Aggregated forces at the 
industry level 
Prescriptive, 1980s 
Cognitive school Source of informational 
ambiguity at the individual 
level 
Descriptive, individual 
Learning school Source of complexity at the Descriptive, organisational 
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organisational level  
Environmental school Source of complexity, 
stability, diversity, hostility as 
well as inertia at the 
organisational level and 
institutional isomorphism at 
the meso and macro level 
Descriptive, incremental 
       
Due to its focus on agency-structure interplay, the critical realist conception of 
the environment appears to be closer to the assumptions of the cognitive and 
learning schools of strategy formation. By contrast, the extreme notions of 
prediction and control on the one hand, and of passive reaction on the other, 
implicit in the three prescriptive schools of strategy formation – design, 
planning, and positioning – and on the three variants of the environmental 
school, respectively – contingent, ecological, and institutional – appear to be 
less aligned with a critical realist view of the environment. 
In fact, if the world is an internally related open system, it is only natural 
that we must not only take an holistic view of the organisation and of the 
environment, but also an integrated view of both. By focusing on how the 
organisation adapts to the environment by incorporating knowledge of the 
environment and acting upon it, the cognitive and the learning school capture 
the relational and open nature of social reality. 
 Of course, to acknowledge the relational and open nature of social reality 
means also to acknowledge that exact prediction of events is not possible in the 
same way as in the natural sciences where closed systems can be obtained in 
laboratory experiments (or exist spontaneously as in astronomy). The best 
guide to strategy formation under those circumstances consists in the study of 
the underlying structures, mechanisms and tendencies that cause events. In the 
case of the cognitive and learning school, the focus is on psychological, social 
and cultural mechanisms through which knowledge-processing takes place. It is 
not possible to predict events using this method, but it provides a more solid 
basis for strategy formation than the attempt to use methods that presuppose 





Samuelson argued long ago that economic models should uncover “more 
realistic and complicated hypotheses”. It could be the case that what 
Samuelson refers to as “more realistic and complicated hypotheses” (emphasis 
added) would be regularities that are not immediately empirically observable. 
The vision that Samuelson presupposes is not one where empirically 
observable regularities exhaust the object of economic analysis, but rather one 
where the world is a complex mixture of different tendencies and causal 
relations that we must uncover using our “abstract models”. 
Friedman also argues that “a hypothesis is important if it ‘explains’ much 
by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass 
of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be 
explained” (Friedman, 1953; 26, emphasis added). And when Friedman claims 
that assumptions must be “false” and “simpler” than the “complex” phenomena 
they analyse, he also seems to be making this point: assumptions are “false” 
because the world is “complex” and the assumptions are “simple”. So there is 
more to the real world than observable empirical regularities. 
It seems therefore that both authors (Samuelson and Friedman) agree 
that the world has underlying structures, tendencies and causal relations that 
are more complicated than what a deductivist model can represent. The 
divergence between Samuelson and Friedman lies neither in their conception of 
the world, nor in the use of deductivist models (which both agree are useful). 
The difference between both consists in their views of what is the goal of 
economic analysis: for Friedman, it is successful prediction with false models, 
while for Samuelson, it is uncovering an underlying structure using these same 
“empirically inadequate” models. 
But it cannot be argued that both Friedman and Samuelson’s 
methodology can uncover structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies 
under open systems, apart from those that are continuously actualised and 
hence empirically observable as constant conjunctions: deductivist models are 
only appropriate if closure conditions hold. 
A different sort of economic explanation consists in causal explanation of 
underlying structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies, using partial 
regularities as a starting point for abstraction and contrast explanation. After 
recognising this, it is then possible to propose alternatives to Friedman’s 
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methodology, and to say that prediction of events is not sufficient, because it is 
not necessary (and it may not even be possible or desirable) for economic 
explanation. 
Those alternatives are relevant not only for our understanding of the 
economic environment, but also for our understanding of the organisation which 
acts in that environment. Underlying structures, powers, mechanisms and 
tendencies do not always manifest themselves in observable events, but over 
time they become manifest as long-term partial regularities. This means that 
fields of management research more concerned with structural and long-term 
processes are those that can benefit more from this type of analysis. Strategy 
is, evidently, the field which stands more in need of looking at structural long 
term-processes, and of integrating the multitude of varied information that the 
organisation receives. 
In order to improve strategy formation, a crucial step is to look beyond 
the vast amount of information that always emerges in open systems such as 
the organisation and the environment, and look at the underlying structures and 
mechanisms through which knowledge of the environment is processed by the 
organisation. In fact, since contemporary mainstream economists still maintain 
the deductivist approach advocated by Samuelson and Friedman fifty years 
ago, despite its inability to explain socio-economic reality in a satisfactory way 
(on which see Lawson, 2003), it seems that there is much work to be done not 
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